### Framework

#### A. Interp – the AFF must defend a USFG policy that either reduces restrictions on or provides financial incentives for energy production.

#### “Resolved” means the framework for the resolution is to enact a policy.

Words and Phrases 64

(Permanent Edition)

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is **“to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;”** It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### The USFG is the government in Washington D.C.

Encarta 0

(http://encarta.msn.com)

 **“The federal government of the United States is centered in Washington DC”**

#### B. Violation— the AFF does not defend the literal USFG implementation of a policy

#### C. Reasons to prefer—

#### 1) Competition – without a stable resolutional advocacy, the AFF can sever all links and moot pre-round prep; competitive equity is valuable and necessary for self-growth. We must have a basis to challenge the AFF and engage in struggle.

Yovel 5

[Jonathan, Faculty of Law at University of Haifa in Israel, “Gay Science as Law: An Outline for a Nietzschean Jurisprudence,” *Nietzsche and Legal Theory: Half-Written Laws*, 2005, rehosted at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=950742>] // myost

While reactive forces respond to their context and in this way are dictated by them, active forces find their own mediums for action. There is a catch, however. **Force needs resistance in order to matter, grow, and be challenged.** In a paragraph whose importance to the understanding of Nietzsche’s “mechanics” of power can hardly be exaggerated, he spells it out**: [S]trong nature . . . needs objects of resistance;** hence it looks for what resists . . . . The strength of those who attack can be measured in a way by the opposition they require: every growth is indicated by the search for a mighty opponent . . . . **The task is not simply to master what happens to resist, but what requires us to stake all our strength, suppleness, and fighting skill**—opponents that are our equals.41 Thus the will is measured in the scope of its challenges**. But the active will is not satisfied by those challenges it happens to come by. For the challenge to be worthwhile it must be the most powerful possible,** and so the Person of Power must cultivate the will to power of those who are not**. In debate, the Person of Power will make the best of her opponent’s position, nourish it, then go after the strong points or strongest version or interpretation.** Kasparov must play Karpov, then Deep Blue. The philosophical problems most worthy of engagement—and Nietzsche spoke of problems as something a philosopher challenges to single combat—are the toughest ones. Of himself, he asserts “I only attack causes which are victorious . . . . I have never taken a step publicly that did not compromise me: that is my criterion of doing right.”42

#### 2) Creation – creativity is only possible within a system of rules. We cannot speak from nowhere, so we must locate ourselves within morality in order to grow or create.

Ramaekers 1

[Stefan, assistant professor at the Laboratory for Education and Society at KU Leuven in Belgium, “Teaching to Lie and Obey: Nietzsche on Education,” *Journal of Philosophy of Education* 35.2 (2001): 255-264] // myost

Much as one values Nietzsche for his cultural criticism and for his culturally innovative ideas, it would be a mistake to overlook the importance he attaches to obedience. Johnston argues that one cannot infer an anarchistic account of education from Nietzsche's writings because of his emphasis on obedience and discipline in the primary school.2 However, Johnston fails to give obedience its rightful place. For Nietzsche's account of morality (particularly in Beyond Good and Evil, and more specifically in the chapter `The Natural History of Morals') shows that **obedience is not just about keeping pupils in line, but means obedience to cultural and historical rules,** and as such is a moral imperative for all of humankind. The most important thing about every system of morals for Nietzsche is that it is `a long constraint', a `tyranny of arbitrary laws'.**3 For such cultural and historical phenomena as virtue, art, music, dancing, reason, spirituality, philosophy, politics and so on the creative act requires not absolute freedom or spontaneous unconstrained development but subordination to what is or at least appears to be `arbitrary'**. It entails a long bondage of the spirit. The singular fact remains . . . that **everything of the nature of freedom**, elegance, boldness, dance, and masterly certainty, which exists or has existed**, whether it be in thought itself, or in administration, or in speaking and persuading**, in art just as in conduct, **has only developed by means of the tyranny of such arbitrary law**; and in all seriousness, it is not at all improbable that precisely this is `nature' and `natural'—and not laisser-aller!4 The nature of morality inspires us to stay far from an excessive freedom and cultivates the need for restricted horizons. This narrowing of perspective is for Nietzsche a condition of life and growth.5 It is interesting to see how this is prefigured in Nietzsche's second Unfashionable Observation (On the Utility and Liability of History for Life). The cure for what he there calls `the historical sickness',6 i.e. an excess of history which attacks the shaping power of life and no longer understands how to utilise the past as a powerful source of nourishment, is (among others) the ahistorical: `the art and power to be able to forget and to enclose oneself in a limited horizon'.7 Human beings cannot live without a belief in something lasting and eternal.8 **Subordination to the rules of a system of morality should not be understood as a deplorable restriction of an individual's possibilities and creative freedom; on the contrary, it is the necessary determination and limitation of the conditions under which anything can be conceived as possible.** **Only from within a particular and arbitrary framework can freedom itself be interpreted as freedom**. In other words, Nietzsche points to the necessity of being embedded in a particular cultural and historical frame. The pervasiveness of this embeddedness can be shown in at least four aspects of Nietzsche's writings. First, in his critique of morality Nietzsche realises all too well that it is impossible to criticise a system of morals from outside, as a view from nowhere. Instead a particular concretisation is required. Beyond Good and Evil may very well, as a prelude to a philosophy of the future, excite dreams about unlooked-for horizons and unknown possibilities. In The Genealogy of Morals, however, written by Nietzsche as further elaboration and elucidation of the same themes, he explicitly states that Beyond Good and Evil does not imply going beyond good and bad.9 Criticising a system of morals inevitably means judging from a particular point of view.

#### 3) Education – we must learn to lie and exploit systems of rules. This is necessary to function in society, where we have to work with others and obey the rules.

Ramaekers 1

[Stefan, assistant professor at the Laboratory for Education and Society at KU Leuven in Belgium, “Teaching to Lie and Obey: Nietzsche on Education,” *Journal of Philosophy of Education* 35.2 (2001): 255-264] // myost

In view of the importance Nietzsche attaches to obedience, to being embedded, one should not be surprised that he considers initiating the child into a particular constellation of arbitrary laws to be a natural part of her education. For the child, education means, at least in the early stages, being subordinated to a particular view of what is worth living for, and being introduced into a system of beliefs. Education consists in teaching the child to see and to value particular things, to handle a perspective: to lie. The argument goes even further. In view of Nietzsche's **perspectivism one must now say that not initiating the child into a perspective, not teaching him to lie is educationally speaking not even an option: the child makes himself familiar with a perspective he cannot ignore since this is the precondition for making sense of anything and exploring the unfamiliar.** Put differently**, because of the necessity of being embedded a human being is moulded into a particular shape that he cannot do without.** My understanding of Nietzsche is consequently at variance with any understanding which argues for a radical individualism and takes the individual to be the point of reference of all values and truths. Johnston35 for example tilts the scales too strongly towards the individual as a self-affirming autonomous agent and hence disregards the epistemologically and ethically constitutive importance of the individual's embeddedness for what she affirms as true and valuable. He even claims that the individual put forward by Nietzsche is the antithesis of the social realm. For Nietzsche, Johnston writes, `there is no question of a reconciliation between the realms of the individual and the social'.36 Referring to Dewey, he makes it look as if the Nietzschean individual can withdraw herself from social embeddednes since she apparently has no need to refer her own action to that of others.37 Adopting a thoroughly Nietzschean stand on education therefore requires, in Johnston's opinion, a break with education conceived as a matter of `making familiar with' and of being initiated into a particular cultural inheritance, that is as a matter of socialisation in this rich sense. In consequence education becomes essentially self-education. It is not hard to see that focusing in this manner on the individual is greatly welcomed by progressive educational movements such as child-centred pedagogies. In their critique of the traditional educational model, characterised simply as a bestowal of values by the educator, they show their concern with the child's personal identity. In this view initiating the child into a particular view of life does injustice to her personal identity, her true self is suppressed, suffocated and not given the opportunity to develop into what it `really' is**. Education should by contrast create room for the self-development of the child's true self:** this seems to be the educational lesson to be learned from Rousseau, Rogers, Steiner and Freinet among others. An emphasis on a particular kind of experiential learning, supported by a distinctive conception of the nature of experience, warrants the child giving meaning to her own life.

#### 4) Purposelessness – the ballot cannot be based on self-affirmation. Such affirmation can have no higher purpose; it cannot require the judge’s authority nor can it be premised on success. Like Sisyphus, only when we persist with no hope of overcoming this world by achieving some metaphysical victory does it become possible to celebrate life. For their 1AC to be meaningful, you should vote for us. Vote NEG to recognize the AFF’s ability to be self-affirming, requiring the anxiety the ballot represents.

Lane 96

[Bob Lane, Instructor at Malaspina University-College in British Columbia, Canada, “The Absurd Hero,” 1996, <http://www.levity.com/corduroy/camusabs.htm>] // myost

Sisyphus is the absurd hero. This man, sentenced to ceaselessly rolling a rock to the top of a mountain and then watching its descent, is the epitome of the absurd hero according to Camus. **In retelling the Myth of Sisyphus, Camus is able to create an extremely powerful image with imaginative force which sums up in an emotional sense the body of the intellectual discussion which precedes it in the book**. We are told that Sisyphus is the absurd hero "as much through his passions as through his torture. His scorn of the gods, his hatred of death, and his passion for life won him that unspeakable penalty in which the whole being is exerted toward accomplishing nothing." (p.89). **Sisyphus is conscious of his plight , and therein lies the tragedy.** For if, during the moments of descent, he nourished the hope that he would yet succeed, then his labour would lose its torment. But Sisyphus is clearly conscious of the extent of his own misery. It is this lucid recognition of his destiny that transforms his torment into his victory. It has to be a victory for as Camus says: I leave Sisyphus at the foot of the mountain! One always finds one's burden again. But Sisyphus teaches the higher fidelity that negates the gods and raises rocks. He too concludes that all is well. **This universe henceforth without a master seems to him neither sterile nor futile**. Each atom of that stone, each mineral flake of that night-filled mountain, in itself forms a world. The struggle itself towards the heights is enough to fill a man's heart. One must imagine Sisyphus happy. (p.91). **Sisyphus' life and torment are transformed into a victory by concentrating on his freedom, his refusal to hope, and his knowledge of the absurdity of his situation**. In the same way, Dr. Rieux is an absurd hero in The Plague, for he too is under sentence of death, is trapped by a seemingly unending torment and, like Sisyphus, **he continues to perform his duty no matter how useless or how insignificant his action.** In both **cases it matters little for what reason they continue to struggle so long as they testify to man's allegiance to man and not to abstractions or 'absolutes'.**

#### D. This is a voter for competition and education. We should fashion the rules of debate to make ourselves more excellent individuals.

Yovel 5

[Jonathan, Faculty of Law at University of Haifa in Israel, “Gay Science as Law: An Outline for a Nietzschean Jurisprudence,” *Nietzsche and Legal Theory: Half-Written Laws*, 2005, rehosted at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=950742>] // myost

**In society, the law that best serves the Person of Power is that which empowers the other to best prepare him for such “war”.**43 **Law must elevate the other’s own powers to the fullest of their potential** (the overman, of course, has no presupposed potential: a potential for her would be power-constraining rather than a horizon for development). The Person of Power will not rely on social norms to serve her in overcoming or in dominating: that is the way of ressentiment. Instead she will form law that will make the best out of that which she must stand up to, namely the others. Nietzsche is no closet-liberal: **the principle of law as empowerment of the other is strictly a mean for the will to become more, for the power to will**.44 Law does not empower the other as a subject, although through empowerment the other might discover her own power and so much the better. The other—**the person enslaved by the psychology of ressentiment, be he called slave or master—needs not be empowered to become less contemptible, yet it is because of his contemptibility that he must be elevated.** Empowerment of the other is the active will’s maxim in the exact sense in which the elevated will categorizes natural phenomenon and shapes cognition and language—namely, creating the environment for the best possibilities for the will to cast itself in the world, both natural and social.

### Indians

CP: We affirm the perspective that wind turbines are beautiful, except for those on Indian land.

#### Wind facilities are built on indigenous lands to maximize profit

Garry, Spurlin and Nelsen 2009

(Patrick Garry, Candice Spurlin, and Derek Nelsen, “Wind Energy in Indian Country: A Study of the Challenges and Opportunities Facing South Dakota Tribes,” South Dakota Law Review)

Indian country has the potential to produce a significant portion of the¶ electricity consumed in the United States. An expressed goal of the Rosebud¶ Sioux Tribe in developing the Owl Feather War Bonnet facility is to produce an¶ economic stimulus for the Tribe through the export of electricity to meet the¶ country’s rising demandf' This economic boost to the Tribe would come not¶ only from the sale of the electricity produced or the fee generated from the¶ leasing of the land to an outside investor, but also from the construction and¶ maintenance of the facilities. The size of the wind farm has a large impact on the amount of revenue¶ generated.6 The Owl Feather War Bonnet Wind Farm will be a 30 Megawatt¶ (MW) facility.-I This facility will produce enough electricity to power 7,500¶ homes without creating any appreciable carbon dioxide emissions? These facts,¶ in concert, create the impetus for attempting to overcome the significant challenges that exist when undertaking such an endeavor?

#### Only shifting the framework to questions of decolonization can we solve- only unconditional acceptance of a decolonizing framework can empower indigenous peoples to break out of colonial oppression

McCaslin and Breton 08 Wanda D. Law Foundation of Saskatchewan Research Officer with the Native Law Centre of Canada, Denise C. founder and executive director of Living Justice Press, “Justice as healing: Going outside the colonizer’s cage,” ,” Handbook of Critical and Indigenous Methodologies, pp 528-529

Suffice it to say, for the purposes of this chapter, we cannot map a step-by-step administrative, legal, theoretical, or any other specific path of decolonization. This is not a job for two people but for entire nations and peoples, and many paths are needed. What we do suggest -and it is by no means news for the colonized-is that any step of change, however well intentioned, will fall prey to the default framework of perpetuating colonial oppression if those involved do not consciously and intentionally make a paradigm shift and claim a framework of decolonization. If we are serious about justice, healing, transformation, and systemic change, then we must doggedly use decolonization as the standard for evaluating whatever is being proposed or implemented: Does it move us closer or farther from our decolonization? Put positively, does it flow from the framework of who we are as peoples and hence engage us in transformation? Certainly this shift begins with naming colonialism as the root harm that needs to be healed. We must assert the reality-shocking and ungrateful as it may seem to many colonizers that the colonial system is not the savior of Indigenous people but our oppressor, the systemic cause of our suffering. Certainly the shift of framework empowers Indigenous peoples to use our own Indigenous means to respond to harms among our people. Indigenous perspectives must be listened to and heard outside the assumption of colonial rule, and Indigenous autonomy and competence in handling our own affairs through our own ways must be unconditionally respected. And certainly the shift of framework involves the serious, genuine, and difficult nation-to-nation work of rectifying the immense crimes against humanity that we have suffered and that have brought us to where we are now as peoples. We do not need more studies or well-meaning programs to "solve our problems" by colonizer governments. We call for nation-to-nation relationships, land return, reparations, restitution, return of resources or payment for their exploitation with interest, adherence to treaties, and hence the return of our sovereign jurisdiction over our homelands and ancestral land bases. Decolonizing is not just a big word; it is the core of healing justice for Indigenous peoples. It signifies a scope of transformation the likes of which we have not yet seen. And, like the fall season, it must come, because the costs of avoiding it are too great for everyone. In short, the vision of the future is not to leave the colonizer's house for a better colonizer's house or to construct a better, more Indigenous friendly cage for our oppression. The aim is remove the cage altogether and instead to rebuild our tipis-or long houses, hogans, iglus, pueblos, wikiups, earth lodges, wigwams, plank houses, grass houses, or chickees. As we move in a decolonizing direction, we will move closer to practicing justice as a way of life-a way that holds the promise of being transformative for all those involved and hence profoundly healing for both the colonized and the colonizers. May the vision of this koucheehiwayhk inspire and sustain us through the rough waters we inevitably face as we move in this turbulent but fundamentally healing direction.

### **Cap K**

#### **The affirmative’s valorization of wind only makes energy production easier and thus cheaper, the logic of capitalism dictates that this only increases consumption resulting in extinction of the planet**

Foster et al 2010 (John Bellamy [prof of sociology @ U of Oregon], Brett Clark [Assistant prof of sociology @ NC State U] and Richard York [assoc. prof of sociology @ U of Oregon]; Capitalism and the Curse of Energy Efficiency; Nov 1; <http://monthlyreview.org/2010/11/01/capitalism-and-the-curse-of-energy-efficiency>; kdf)

The Jevons Paradox was forgotten in the heyday of the age of petroleum during the first three-quarters of the twentieth century, but reappeared in the 1970s due to increasing concerns over resource scarcity associated with the Club of Rome’s Limits to Growth analysis, heightened by the oil-energy crisis of 1973-74. As energy efficiency measures were introduced, economists became concerned with their effectiveness. This led to the resurrection, at the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, of the general question posed by the Jevons Paradox, in the form of what was called the “rebound effect.” This was the fairly straightforward notion that engineering efficiency gains normally led to a decrease in the effective price of a commodity, thereby generating increased demand, so that the gains in efficiency did not produce a decrease in consumption to an equal extent. The Jevons Paradox has often been relegated to a more extreme version of the rebound effect, in which there is a backfire, or a rebound of more than 100 percent of “engineering savings,” resulting in an increase rather than decrease in the consumption of a given resource.30¶ Technological optimists have tried to argue that the rebound effect is small, and therefore environmental problems can be solved largely by technological innovation alone, with the efficiency gains translating into lower throughput of energy and materials (dematerialization). Empirical evidence of a substantial rebound effect is, however, strong. For example, technological advancements in motor vehicles, which have increased the average miles per gallon of vehicles by 30 percent in the United States since 1980, have not reduced the overall energy used by motor vehicles. Fuel consumption per vehicle stayed constant while the efficiency gains led to the augmentation, not only of the numbers of cars and trucks on the roads (and the miles driven), but also their size and “performance” (acceleration rate, cruising speed, etc.)—so that SUVs and minivans now dot U.S. highways. At the macro level, the Jevons Paradox can be seen in the fact that, even though the United States has managed to double its energy efficiency since 1975, its energy consumption has risen dramatically. Juliet Schor notes that over the last thirty-five years:¶ energy expended per dollar of GDP has been cut in half. But rather than falling, energy demand has increased, by roughly 40 percent. Moreover, demand is rising fastest in those sectors that have had the biggest efficiency gains—transport and residential energy use. Refrigerator efficiency improved by 10 percent, but the number of refrigerators in use rose by 20 percent. In aviation, fuel consumption per mile fell by more than 40 percent, but total fuel use grew by 150 percent because passenger miles rose. Vehicles are a similar story. And with soaring demand, we’ve had soaring emissions. Carbon dioxide from these two sectors has risen 40 percent, twice the rate of the larger economy.¶ Economists and environmentalists who try to measure the direct effects of efficiency on the lowering of price and the immediate rebound effect generally tend to see the rebound effect as relatively small, in the range of 10 to 30 percent in high-energy consumption areas such as home heating and cooling and cars. But once the indirect effects, apparent at the macro level, are incorporated, the Jevons Paradox remains extremely significant. It is here at the macro level that scale effects come to bear: improvements in energy efficiency can lower the effective cost of various products, propelling the overall economy and expanding overall energy use.31 Ecological economists Mario Giampietro and Kozo Mayumi argue that the Jevons Paradox can only be understood in a macro-evolutionary model, where improvements in efficiency result in changes in the matrices of the economy, such that the overall effect is to increase scale and tempo of the system as a whole.32¶ Most analyses of the Jevons Paradox remain abstract, based on isolated technological effects, and removed from the historical process. They fail to examine, as Jevons himself did, the character of industrialization. Moreover, they are still further removed from a realistic understanding of the accumulation-driven character of capitalist development. An economic system devoted to profits, accumulation, and economic expansion without end will tend to use any efficiency gains or cost reductions to expand the overall scale of production. Technological innovation will therefore be heavily geared to these same expansive ends. It is no mere coincidence that each of the epoch-making innovations (namely, the steam engine, the railroad, and the automobile) that dominated the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries were characterized by their importance in driving capital accumulation and the positive feedback they generated with respect to economic growth as a whole—so that the scale effects on the economy arising from their development necessarily overshot improvements in technological efficiency.33 Conservation in the aggregate is impossible for capitalism, however much the output/input ratio may be increased in the engineering of a given product. This is because all savings tend to spur further capital formation (provided that investment outlets are available). This is especially the case where core industrial resources—what Jevons called “central materials” or “staple products”—are concerned.¶ The Fallacy of Dematerialization¶ The Jevons Paradox is the product of a capitalist economic system that is unable to conserve on a macro scale, geared, as it is, to maximizing the throughput of energy and materials from resource tap to final waste sink. Energy savings in such a system tend to be used as a means for further development of the economic order, generating what Alfred Lotka called the “maximum energy flux,” rather than minimum energy production.34 The deemphasis on absolute (as opposed to relative) energy conservation is built into the nature and logic of capitalism as a system unreservedly devoted to the gods of production and profit. As Marx put it: “Accumulate, accumulate! That is Moses and the prophets!”35¶ Seen in the context of a capitalist society, the Jevons Paradox therefore demonstrates the fallacy of current notions that the environmental problems facing society can be solved by purely technological means. Mainstream environmental economists often refer to “dematerialization,” or the “decoupling” of economic growth, from consumption of greater energy and resources. Growth in energy efficiency is often taken as a concrete indication that the environmental problem is being solved. Yet savings in materials and energy, in the context of a given process of production, as we have seen, are nothing new; they are part of the everyday history of capitalist development.36 Each new steam engine, as Jevons emphasized, was more efficient than the one before. “Raw materials-savings processes,” environmental sociologist Stephen Bunker noted, “are older than the Industrial Revolution, and they have been dynamic throughout the history of capitalism.” Any notion that reduction in material throughput, per unit of national income, is a new phenomenon is therefore “profoundly ahistorical.”37¶ What is neglected, then, in simplistic notions that increased energy efficiency normally leads to increased energy savings overall, is the reality of the Jevons Paradox relationship—through which energy savings are used to promote new capital formation and the proliferation of commodities, demanding ever greater resources. Rather than an anomaly, the rule that efficiency increases energy and material use is integral to the “regime of capital” itself.38 As stated in The Weight of Nations, an important empirical study of material outflows in recent decades in five industrial nations (Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, the United States, and Japan): “Efficiency gains brought by technology and new management practices have been offset by [increases in] the scale of economic growth.”39¶ The result is the production of mountains upon mountains of commodities, cheapening unit costs and leading to greater squandering of material resources. Under monopoly capitalism, moreover, such commodities increasingly take the form of artificial use values, promoted by a vast marketing system and designed to instill ever more demand for commodities and the exchange values they represent—as a substitute for the fulfillment of genuine human needs. Unnecessary, wasteful goods are produced by useless toil to enhance purely economic values at the expense of the environment. Any slowdown in this process of ecological destruction, under the present system, spells economic disaster.¶ In Jevons’s eyes, the “momentous choice” raised by a continuation of business as usual was simply “between brief but true [national] greatness and longer continued mediocrity.” He opted for the former—the maximum energy flux. A century and a half later, in our much bigger, more global—but no less expansive—economy, it is no longer simply national supremacy that is at stake, but the fate of the planet itself. To be sure, there are those who maintain that we should “live high now and let the future take care of itself.” To choose this course, though, is to court planetary disaster. The only real answer for humanity (including future generations) and the earth as a whole is to alter the social relations of production, to create a system in which efficiency is no longer a curse—a higher system in which equality, human development, community, and sustainability are the explicit goals.

#### Strategies of energy production are co-opted by capitalism as a means to fuel production. The aff thus does not produce energy to satisfy human needs—rather, it exploits the energy produced by the working class to do nothing but further sustain strategies of domination and exploitation

ICConline 11 on August 16, 2011, “Nuclear energy, capitalism and communism”

<http://en.internationalism.org/wr/347/nuclear>

The revolution in the form and quantity of energy available to humanity underpinned the industrial revolution and opened the door from the realm of want to that of plenty. But this revolution was driven by the development of capitalism whose purpose is not the satisfaction of human needs but the increase of capital based on the appropriation of surplus value produced by an exploited working class. Energy is used to drive the development of productivity but it is also a cost of production. It is part of the constant capital alongside raw materials, machines and factories and, as such, tends to increase in relation to the variable capital that is the source of capitalism’s profits. It is this that dictates capitalism’s attitude to energy.¶ Capitalism has no regard for the use of energy, for the destruction of finite resources, other than as a cost of production. Increased productivity tends to require increased energy, so the capitalists (other than those in the oil industry) are driven to try and reduce the cost of this energy. On the one hand this results in the profligate use of energy for irrational ends, such as transporting similar commodities back and forth across the world and the ceaseless multiplication of commodities that meet no real human need but serve only as a means to extract and realise surplus value. On the other, it leads to the denial of access to energy and to the products of energy for millions of humans who lack the money to be of interest to the capitalists. This is illustrated in Nigeria where Shell pumps out billions of dollars worth of oil while the local people go without or risk their lives by trying to illegally tap the oil from the pipeline. The price is also paid by those working in the energy industries in lives lost and bodies maimed or poisoned and by the environment and all that lives in it, from the polluted, toxic waters of the Thames that characterised 19th century London to the warming of the globe that threatens the future of humanity today.

#### There is no pure pursuit of what makes us happy- pleasure gets coopted into conservative politics and makes us complicit in environmental destruction and imperialist wars

Kincheloe 07Joe Canada Research Chair of Critical Pedagogy at McGill University “Critical Pedagogy in the Twenty-First Century: Evolution for Survival,” Critical Pedagogy: Where are we now, p 30-31

Pleasure is a powerful social educator, and the pleasure produced by capital teaches a very conservative political lesson: since corporations produce pleasure, we should align our interests with them. In this way our "affect11 is organized in the service of capital: lower corporate taxes, better business climates, equation of the corporate bottom line with social well- being, larger executive salaries, lower labor costs, fewer environmental regulations, and support for imperial wars, to name just a few. Hegemony in this new context operates where affect and politics intersect: the cultural realm. The revolutionary feature of this repressive, capital-driven ideological education is that culture shapes the political. Critical pedagogues have sometimes failed to appreciate this circumstance, not to mention its dramatic impact on the shaping of political consciousness and subjectivity.

The politics of affirmation are in direct opposition to the ability for critique and negativity. The affirmatives strategy is ignorant to the effects that our neo-liberal economic regime has allowed fundamentalism to fill the gaps left by their attempt at affirmation.

**Dean 2005** Jodi A politics of avoidance: the limits of weak ontology http://jdeanicite.typepad.com/i\_cite/files/butler\_and\_ontology.doc

White finds such affirmative gestures in the work of seemingly disparate thinkers—George Kateb, Charles Taylor, William Connolly, and Judith Butler. He reads these liberal, communitarian, feminist, and post-Nietzschean thinkers as responding to universalist, foundationalist, and essentialist claims. In so doing, he distills from them a common practice of tempering, easing, or defanging one’s own theoretical position, a practice characteristic of what White refers to as a weak ontology. White understands weak ontologies to involve a tentativeness or uncertainty in the face of the recognition of the contestability of one’s own fundaments, to account for human being in terms of constituent attributes of “language, finitude, natality, and sources” (9), to emphasize cultivation rather than argument, conversion, confrontation, or compulsion, and, to involve a kind of contextualized reflection, alteration, or folding of the theory’s ethical-political aims back into its ontological position. Weak ontologies are thus theories that embrace their own contestability and understand their theoretical task less in terms of presenting claims to truth or irrefutable arguments than of nudging, suggesting, offering, or affirming practices and ways of thinking as valuable, generous, and responsive to the multiplicities and contingencies of late-modern life.

What a lovely notion. What a nice, nice approach. With his account of weak ontologies, White is elaborating a project of immanent affirmation, what we might understand as the opposite of the old Frankfurt School idea of immanent critique. Rather than setting out a critique of the present, White draws from differing projects to present a positive approach to the contemporary. In the conclusion, he points to this “yes” to contemporary life as he reassures political liberals who could raise concerns that the ethos of weak ontology might affect the basic constitutional structure of the liberal democratic state (153). There’s no need to worry, White reassures them: “this ethos does not cast wholesale doubt upon constitutional structures. Rather it points us primarily toward different ways of living those structures.” With such a move, White divests approaches like Butler’s of their critical edge in order to make them congenial to current power relations.

In my view, critical, as opposed to affirmative, theory is necessary today. White’s position assumes a political-economic consensus that no longer exists. He repeats without revising Charles Taylor’s presumption that a felicitous

ontological claim assumes the modern welfare state and market economy (70). This assumption is deadly—and deadly wrong. It mistakes the tenacious energy with which the Right in the US (and other countries) is transforming the state. The welfare state has been crumbling since the seventies. Neoliberal economics has replaced the welfare state’s generalized sense of social solidarity and the collective assumption of risk with the brutal extremes of economic inequality and the heightened violence and fear of the society of control. In the name of freedom and security, as if these concepts fit easily together, all three branches of the US government have acquiesced to the use of torture. Consequently, we now must fight anew for human equality and dignity. We have to find new arguments, arguments fitting for mobile populations in an integrated world, for just and sustained economies, for common approaches to living together.

#### **Replacing opposition to violence with reflection ultimately fails- the AFF will never be able to solve because resistance will always be replaced with more reflection**

Matthews 07 PhaenEx, Vol 2, No 1 (2007)The Limits of Transcendence RICHARD MATTHEWS http://www.phaenex.uwindsor.ca/ojs/leddy/index.php/phaenex/article/viewFile/67/244

Note the philosophical and moral commitments here. In order to oppose suffering, violence and murder, we have to accept that these are real and not simply functions of interpretation. They cannot be reducible to interpretive spin or defined out of existence, even if cultural background and interpretation itself may change how individuals and communities experience suffering. Rather the reverse is true—oppression and suffering are constraining moral and philosophical limits on interpretation. If definition and interpretation are prior to the historical phenomenon, then problems vanish with redefinition. To avoid this it is crucial that interpretation be adequate to the relevant state of affairs. If we are to be correct in understanding and interpreting an act of violence, it has to be the case that the violence was real (or not) in that specific case. This means we also need the ordinary and everyday Aristotelian notion of truth, in particular the specific version that insists we be able to say of that which is, that it is, and of that which is not, that it is not (Tarski 333). It also means, as Camus emphasizes throughout his writings, that we need ordinary deductive and inductive reasoning. Furthermore, it requires philosophical fidelity to such events, i.e. a refusal to transcend such facts where the transcendence results in their sublation. For suppose that we do not insist upon such truths, facts, and fidelity to the experiences—in such a case, we really would have a nihilism in which any interpretation would be as good as any other, and in which violence would be nothing more than a function of the beliefs of a given perceiver—truly a Thrasymachean position if ever there was one. Camus opposes the desire to stand above and transcend the norms and experiences of one’s epoch with the desire to understand them on their own terms and as worthy of explanation and interpretation in their own right. The combination of moral fact, logic, honesty, and fallibilism is essential. Hence Camus notes that although the experience of the absurd is essential to recognizing the impossibility of the possession of absolute truth, nonetheless, respect for deductive reasoning means that it cannot entail nihilism. Nihilism simultaneously entails both killing and not killing and thus infers a false proposition (Camus, The Rebel 15). By any standard account of deductive reasoning nihilism is unsound. In “Towards Dialogue” he notes that the fight against absolutist ideologies can only be carried out using the limited historical reason that respects ordinary logic and the facts of oppression (137). For Camus this suggests that we cannot oppose torturers without being able to say: 1. that it is a fact that they torture; and 2. that it is a fact that torture is a moral wrong. We must be able to say both that “The torturer carried out these acts at these times to these specific individuals” and that “it is wrong for him/her to have done so.” Moreover, if we do not treat these facts as philosophically fundamental, then we will undermine, if not destroy, our ability to oppose them. At best, our opposition will become provisional—subject to philosophical or political expediency. Alternatively we will become silent about them altogether on philosophical grounds. They will not be significant because there would then not be any such moral facts or truths. Either the theory of truth and the facts will be undermined in favour of some other kind of reflection, or the theory of truth and some sense of facts will be preserved, but moral truths will be excluded from consideration.

Ethics alt-

Resisting reliance on economic evaluation is the ultimate ethical responsibility – the current social order guarantees social exclusion on a global scale

**Zizek and Daly 2k4** (Slavoj and Glyn, Conversations with Zizek page 14-16)

For Zizek it is imperative that we cut through this Gordian knot of postmodern protocol and recognize that our ethico-political responsibility is to confront the constitutive violence of today’s global capitalism and its obscene naturalization / anonymization of the millions who are subjugated by it throughout the world. Against the standardized positions of postmodern culture – with all its pieties concerning ‘multiculturalist’ etiquette – Zizek is arguing for a politics that might be called ‘radically incorrect’ in the sense that it break with these types of positions 7 and focuses instead on the very organizing principles of today’s social reality: the principles of global liberal capitalism. This requires some care and subtlety.
For far too long, Marxism has been bedeviled by an almost fetishistic economism that has tended towards political morbidity. With the likes of Hilferding and Gramsci, and more recently Laclau and Mouffee, crucial theoretical advances have been made that enable the transcendence of all forms of economism. In this new context, however, Zizek argues that the problem that now presents itself is almost that of the opposite fetish. That is to say, the prohibitive anxieties surrounding the taboo of economism can function as a way of not engaging with economic reality and as a way of implicitly accepting the latter as a basic horizon of existence. In an ironic Freudian-Lacanian twist, the fear of economism can end up reinforcing a de facto economic necessity in respect of contemporary capitalism (i.e. the initial prohibition conjures up the very thing it fears).

This is not to endorse any kind of retrograde return to economism. Zizek’s point is rather that in rejecting economism we should not lose sight of the systemic power of capital in shaping the lives and destinies of humanity and our very sense of the possible. In particular we should not overlook Marx’s central insight that in order to create a universal global system the forces of capitalism seek to conceal the politico-discursive violence of its construction through a kind of gentrification of that system. What is persistently denied by neo-liberals such as Rorty (1989) and Fukuyama (1992) is that the gentrification of global liberal capitalism is one whose ‘universalism’ fundamentally reproduces and depends upon a disavowed violence that excludes vast sectors of the world’s populations. In this way, neo-liberal ideology attempts to naturalize capitalism by presenting its outcomes of winning and losing as if they were simply a matter of chance and sound judgment in a neutral market place.

Capitalism does indeed create a space for a certain diversity, at least for the central capitalist regions, but it is neither neutral nor ideal and its price in terms of social exclusion is exorbitant. That is to say, the human cost in terms of inherent global poverty and degraded ‘life-chances’ cannot be calculated within the existing economic rationale and, in consequence, social exclusion remains mystified and nameless (viz. the patronizing reference to the ‘developing world’). And Zizek’s point is that this mystification is magnified through capitalism’s profound capacity to ingest its own excesses and negativity: to redirect (or misdirect) social antagonisms and to absorb them within a culture of differential affirmation. Instead of Bolshevism, the tendency today is towards a kind of political boutiquism that is readily sustained by postmodern forms of consumerism and lifestyle.

Against this Zizek argues for a new universalism whose primary ethical directive is to confront the fact that our forms of social existence are founded on exclusion on a global scale. While it is perfectly true that universalism can never become Universal (it will always require a hegemonic-particular embodiment in order to have any meaning), what is novel about Zizek’s universalism is that it would not attempt to conceal this fact or reduce the status of the abject Other to that of a ‘glitch’ in an otherwise sound matrix.

### Case

**Aesthetics cannot escape the universality and objectivity it purports to criticize because its adoption is always an imposition underwritten by certain manifestations of power and merely substitutes an absolute void. The turn inward to the self leaves the public in a state of indeterminacy and unfreedom— reducing others to objects to be enjoyed and making will and impulse our only grounds for practical choice.**

Lawrence J. **Biskowski**, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Georgia, 19**95**, Politics Versus Aesthetics: Arendt’s Critiques of Nietzsche and Heidegger, The Review of Politics, Vol. 57, No. 1, Winter 1995, pg 61-64

Compelling explorations of the more tyrannical aspects of instrumental and subject-centered reason, moral systems based upon intrinsic purposes or teloi, grand narratives, and the like have led thinkers in the Nietzschean tradition to embrace aesthetics as a paradigm for thinking about the self and its various relationships to itself, to others, and to the world. Aesthetic ways of thinking appear to many contemporary theorists to be the best alternative-in some cases the sole alternative-to the instrumental or technological logics increasingly pervading virtually all other spheres of modern life, to the problematic assumptions and hidden violence of various "command" and neo-Kantian moral theories, and to the transcendental egoism of attempts to anchor identity in various perceptions of natural law, intrinsic purpose, or potential consensus. But this shift to aesthetics seems to require a radical departure from previous means of understanding human interaction and orienting ourselves in the world. Thus, to take an extreme, seemingly bizarre, but nevertheless illustrative example**,** Jean Baudrillard insists that "we live everywhere already in an '[a]esthetic' hallucination of reality." Everything, "even if it be the everyday and banal reality, falls by this token under the sign of art, and becomes [a] esthetic."

The attractions of aesthetic thinking in a world still recover­ing from its metaphysical hangover and still largely lacking in alternatives and curatives are enormous. Indeed, as Lawrence Scaff puts it, aesthetics and aesthetic ways of thinking seem

to have invaded everywhere, now threatening to subordinate indepen­dent orders, such as the ethical or political, to its own standards and forms. Aesthetic indifference to "substance" and an overriding concern with the perfection of "form" encourage a kind of action and judgment oriented toward impression, rhythm, tempo, gesture, symbolization­in a word, toward style."

The criteria and logics of aesthetics expand to fill the roles formerly filled by the criteria and logics associated with now-discredited or putatively obsolete institutions, practices, traditions, moral systems, and religions. Concern with style follows from the accession of a public life based largely on image and increasingly devoid of any other sense of reality for many people. The leap to Baudrillard's insistence that we live in an "aesthetic hallucination of reality" is a surprisingly short one.

Style, however, is not beauty. Even aesthetics insofar as it was formerly concerned with supposedly objective, public, or at least widely shared standards of beauty **is undermined** among contemporary intellectuals by the **same** **radical historicism** which, by undermining other logics, institutions, understandings, and so forth, provided the conditions for its expansion and elevation. **Standards of beauty are no more objective and universal than standards of justice, virtue, and truth; their adoption is always an imposition underwritten by some manifestation of power**. With all such public standards discredited, individuals are thrown back on themselves or, rather, on their **will** **and**, more typically, on their **impulses**, as their **only grounds for practical choices**. Coupled with an increasing recognition of how identity is formed and stabilized, this experience leads to a diminished sense of the unity and consistency of the self," which in turn leads to the enormous surge in interest among contemporary theorists in the politics of identity, the nature of the self, and the political and moral implications of a de-centered subjectivity.

Thus in at least some significant respects, and for good or for ill, the aestheticism being proffered in somewhat different ways in both public and intellectual life is an aestheticism of self fascination and self-absorption. The self, understood as a multiplicity, must be at the center of all authentic choices and values (which may, of course, **be contradicted at any time**), or the criteria for such choices at least should come from within. Moral or aesthetic or political criteria imposed upon the individual from the outside cannot be legitimate. Of paramount concern, therefore, are the forces of external coercion, including, especially, the surreptitious and intrusive socialization technologies by which the self and its various understandings and values have heretofore been shaped, and the means by which these technologies may be overcome so that one may finally be free to be what one authentically is, if indeed one believes this goal remains within the realm of the possible.

This turn inward and toward the self, surely the product of liberating insights, **is not without its dangers**. To the extent that the aesthetic supersession of morality means that individuals are thrown back on themselves or their impulses as their only grounds for practical choices**, they are left in a state of indeterminacy and unfreedom**, ultimately unable to determine even their own identities except in one rather limited way. In the absence of legitimate moral criteria of any source or kind, they are in effect **controlled by changing whims and arbitrary impulses;** they confront **other people and the world** in much the same way that a sculptor confronts a block of marble, that is, as (at least) potential **sources of aesthetic enjoyment**, as potential sources of resistance to the realization of one's project(s), and ultimately as something that exists solely or mainly as a medium for self-expression. As Hegel described an earlier version of this doctrine:

[t]his type of subjectivism not merely substitutes a void for the whole of ethics, rights, duties, and laws ...but in addition its form is a subjective void, i.e., it knows itself as this contentless void and in this knowledge knows itself as absolute. 13

For Hegel, **freedom under these conditions was emptied of all direction and purpose**. Perhaps more startling yet are the other political (and moral) implications: Laws, rights, duties, and obli­gations, but also people, institutions, things, and the world itself can become our playthings, little more than media for our im­pulses and caprices lionized as self-expression.